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Abstract 
Identity federations enable users, service providers and identity providers from different 
organizations to exchange authentication and authorization information in a secure way. In 
this paper we present a novel identity federation architecture for cloud services based on the 
integration of a cloud identity management service with an Authentication, Authorization and 
Accounting (AAA) infrastructure. Specifically we analyse how this type of AAA-based 
federation can be smoothly integrated into OpenStack, the leading open source cloud software 
solution, using the IETF Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) 
specification for authentication and authorization. We provide details of the implementation 
undertaken in 
2ǯCLASSe project, and show its validation in a real testbed. 
Keywords: Identity federation, ABFAB, OpenStack, Cloud, authentication, authorization, 
GÉANT, CLASSe 
1 Introduction 
The increasing amount of shared services and data across networks has also increased the 
security concerns about how to protect them, and how to enable authenticated and 
authorized users to gain access to them in a safe way. One of the most deployed solutions to 
protect these widely distributed services is the establishment of identity federations. Identity 
federations enable a user, who is affiliated with a particular organization (the Identity 
Provider - IdP), to access the services provided by a second organization in the federation (the 
Service Provider - SP) [COMST].  Typically the user is authenticated by the IdP, which 
provides an authentication assertion to the SP proving she has been successfully 
authenticated in her home organization. After that, the SP may run an authorization process 
to check whether the user possesses the required permissions to access the requested service. 
This authorization decision can be based on authorization data (or attributes) local to the SP 
or received from the IdP. The federation defines and regulates the trust relationships between 
the different IdPs and SPs to make this possible.  
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Traditionally, identity federations have been based on technologies such as SAML [SAML2], 
OAuth [OAUTH], OpenID [OPENID] or more recently OpenID Connect [OIDC], though the 
scope has been generally limited to web applications and services. One of the most successful 
examples of web identity federation infrastructures is eduGAIN [EDUGAIN]. eduGAIN is a 
service that interconnects about 38 federation members composed by more that 3,200 
educational and research institutions around the globe.    
Network based federations on the other hand have been traditionally based on 
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) trust infrastructures [RFC2903], making 
use of the so-called AAA protocols, such as RADIUS [RADIUS] or DIAMETER [DIAMETER]. 
Examples of AAA identity federations can be found in eduroam [EDUROAM] and in 3GPP 
networks [3GPP].  In fact, eduroam is a world-wide network roaming access service deployed 
in 76 countries and available to thousands of institutions. Both eduGAIN and eduroam are 
initiatives being deployed under the umbrella of the European GÉANT consortium [GEANT]. 
More recently, emerging non-web networking scenarios, such as the Cloud, the Grid, and 
mobile devices, are demanding a federation technology that can cater for their need to 
support CLIs (Command Line Interfaces) or bespoke applications without involving excessive 
complexity or web browsers. Organizations such as the IETF, Cloud Security Alliance and 
OASIS have echoed this need [CSA] [OASIS]. For this reason, the IETF created the Application 
Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) WG [ABFAB], in order to promote the 
development of a single unifying technology for extending the benefits of federated identity to 
a broad range of application services (cloud, e-mail, file storage, remote access, instant 
messaging, etc.).   
In ABFAB, the end user, through a Client application, authenticates with its IdP in order to 
get access to a particular SP (also called the Relying Party (RP) in the ABFAB context). The 
Client requests access to the RP by means of the well-known GSS-API [GSSAPI] and the 
underlying application protocol. The RP then contacts the IdP in order to launch the 
authentication and authorization process. To achieve this, an AAA infrastructure 
interconnecting IdPs and RPs is deployed.  The federated authentication is performed using 
the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [EAP] between the Client application and the IdP. 
EAP packets between the Client and the RP are transported using a new GSS-API mechanism 
called GSS-EAP [GSSEAP], whereas the AAA infrastructure is leveraged to deliver the EAP 
packets between RP and IdP. After the authentication succeeds, the IdP may deliver SAML 
assertions for authorization purposes to the RP including information (i.e. identity attributes) 
about the user.  
This new trend for Identity Federations Beyond-Web is gaining devotees, as organizations 
such as JANET and RedIRIS, the British and Spanish NRENs (National Research and Education 
Networks) respectively, are now promoting the deployment of ABFAB technologies in their 
countries [USEC]. Moreover, the GÉANT project [GEANT], involving most European NRENs, is 
also establishing a pilot for these technologies, in anticipation of its future convergence with 
its already well-established eduroam service that has hundreds of thousands of users per day.  
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Aimed at the integration of Cloud services and non-web based identity federations, the 
European research project CLASSe (Cloud ABFAB Federation Services in eduroam) [CLASSE], 
scoped under the GÉANT GN3Plus Opencall umbrella, was launched to investigate how to 
provide federated access to cloud services using ABFAB. As a reference implementation of 
cloud services, CLASSe used OpenStack [OSTACK], since it is one of the most popular open 
source cloud computing packages.  
This paper presents the results of the CLASSe project and analyzes how identity 
federations based on AAA infrastructures can be smoothly integrated in OpenStack. In 
particular, it describes how OpenStack can take advantage of the work being standardized in 
the ABFAB WG, given a powerful authentication and authorization mechanism for cloud users 
and services when cloud providers share an AAA infrastructure. Moreover, it also provides 
general guidelines describing how other Cloud solutions could integrate with the ABFAB 
technologies. This kind of support fills the existing gap of using CLI (Command Line Interface) 
applications when enabling federated access in Cloud scenarios. 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of this proposal we extended the OpenStack 
software to make use of the reference ABFAB implementation, Moonshot [MSHOT], and 
deployed a testbed scenario making use of this software. A performance analysis is also 
described showing the computational and time requirements for these kinds of scenarios. It is 
worth mentioning that this proposal also fits in those scenarios proposed by ǯ 3GPP 
where AAA networks and application services, including cloud services, are combined, for 
example in [IMSCCA] [C3GPPIMS].  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the background 
technologies. Section 3 summarizes some related work on integrating OpenStack with 
different authentication mechanisms. Section 4 describes how current versions of Openstack 
handle federated authentication and authorisation. Section 5 describes conceptually how 
OpenStack can be integrated with the ABFAB protocol suite to support AAA federation. 
Section 6 describes our implementation and demonstration service, using the Moonshot 
software [MSHOT]. Finally, section 7 concludes and describes where further work is still 
needed. 
2 Background Technologies 
This section introduces the reader to the two main technologies that are the basis of this 
work: OpenStack, one of the most popular open source implementations of cloud software, 
and ABFAB, the 	ǯstandards for identity federations for non-web based services. 
2.1 OpenStack and Keystone 
OpenStack is a cloud software composed of several modules providing different cloud 
services: Nova for virtual computing, Neutron for networking, Swift for file and object storage, 
etc. These modules communicate with each other and with external entities through HTTP 
RESTFUL [REST] APIs.  One of these modules, Keystone, provides the identity services 
4 
(authentication and authorization) to the rest of the modules in OpenStack. As such Keystone 
is a critical component of the infrastructure.  
Keystone supports multiple kinds of identity credentials (e.g. username/password or X.509 
certificates) and authentication technologies (Kerberos, LDAP, etc.).  Prior to the addition of 
federated access, OpenStack typically required a backend LDAP [LDAP] database to hold the 
users, groups, roles and project information. Since 2014, Keystone has supported federated 
access, although the first version (in the Icehouse release) only supported the SAMLv2 
protocol [SAML2].  
Prior research [FEDOS] added protocol independent federated identity management 
directly into the Keystone Grizzly and Havana releases, but this design supported the 
federation protocol handling via Keystone plugins. The Keystone core developers decided not 
to support any federation protocol handling in their core code, so opted instead to use an 
Apache [APACHE] front end to handle these, since many different applications already 
successfully use Apache for federated login. Since then, and as part of the CLASSe project, the 
authors worked closely with the Keystone core group in order to remove any SAML 
dependencies from the core code, so that alternative federation protocols, such as ABFAB, 
could be used, providing there was an appropriate Apache authentication module. 
Briefly, OpenStack uses a type of Role Based Access Control (RBAC), although it is not pure 
NIST RBAC [NIST], since <Users> and <Groups> are assigned to <Roles> and <Projects> pairs, 
rather than simply to <Roles>. <Roles> are given permission to access project resources, 
usually through rules in policy files (separate policy files are used by each OpenStack service: 
Keystone, Nova, Glance, etc.) although Swift uses conventional access control lists. The RBAC 
objects are defined in Keystone as follows: 
 <User>: Represents a registered user in a particular OpenStack instance. 
 <Group>: Represents a collection of <User> objects.  
 <Project>: Represents a set of resources that are available on the OpenStack instance (e.g. 
set of virtual machines, virtual containers, etc.). 
 <Role>. Represents a set of rights and privileges that delimit which actions a <User> or a 
<Group> can perform over the different resources associated to a <Project>.  
For instance, the <User> named Alice might have been assigned the <Role> Admin (giving 
full access to all the resources) for the <Project> TestDeployment, and the <Role> Member 
(giving read-only access) in the <Project> ProductionDeployment. 
Keystone was modeled on Kerberos [KERBEROS], in that after the user has successfully 
authenticated (s)he is given a Keystone token, called an unscoped token, which is equivalent to 
the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). The user now chooses which <Project> (s)he 
wishes to be associated with, and his unscoped token is swapped for an appropriate scoped 
token (equivalent to a Kerberos Service Ticket (ST)) that lists his <Roles> in the chosen 
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<Project>. The scoped token allows the user to talk to the various OpenStack services and be 
granted access according to its RBAC policy for the project. 
Three types of tokens are currently supported by Keystone: a PKI based token that allows ǯ locally without contacting Keystone, a 
UUID opaque token that services have to pass back to Keystone for validation, and a Fernet 
token that likewise has to be passed back to Keystone for full validation. UUID tokens are 
randomly generated 32 character strings that have to be stored by Keystone, whereas Fernet 
tokens contain minimal identity and authorization information about the user and are 
symmetrically encrypted using AES-CBC and signed using a SHA256 HMAC. PKI tokens on the 
other hand are much larger, several kilobytes in fact, and contain all the identity and 
authorization information about the user. They are asymmetrically signed. Due to their size 
and poor performance they are gradually being phased out. 
Unfortunately, all Keystone tokens are bearer tokens, which means that if any token is      ǯ    ǡ      
masquerade as the user. It has been a long running debate inside the Keystone group [KS-
GROUP] when or if to make the tokens non-bearer, by making the users prove possession of 
them, but it is not known when this enhancement might be added. 
From the point of view of identity federation, one can see that Keystone acts very similarly 
to an Identity Provider in federated access, in that the user authenticates to Keystone and is 
given an assertion (the scoped token) that allows the user to talk to the various OpenStack 
services. We used this in our original federation design [FEDOS] to add support to Keystone to 
receive an assertion from a federated IdP as proof of user authentication. Keystone then ǯǡǤ 
2.2 ABFAB  
ABFAB promotes the development of a single unifying technology for federated identity that is 
valid for any kind of application service. The ABFAB WG has proposed several standards, 
which are being implemented in the Moonshot project [MSHOT]. ABFAB is based on a widely 
accepted set of security protocols such as AAA, EAP, GSS-API and SAML, and it is composed of 
three main entities:  
 Client application, representing the user wishing to access a particular service or 
application, 
 Relying Party (RP) that controls access to the service, 
 Identity Provider (IdP) that verifies the userǯprovides assertions about 
her identity (e.g. affiliation, entitlement, location) to the RP. 
As Figure 1 describes, the application protocol (e.g. FTP, SSH, HTTP, or SMTP) is executed 
between the Client and the RP. On top of this protocol, as part of an access control procedure, 
a GSS-API security context must be successfully established between the Client and RP, 
playing the roles of GSS Initiator and GSS Acceptor respectively. This GSS context mutually 
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authenticates both entities. Nowadays, many application services either provide direct 
support for GSS-API, or it can be integrated by means of the GS2 Mechanism Family [GS2] and 




















Figure 1. ABFAB architecture 
Although the user identification process is performed using the GSS-API, the actual 
authentication process is carried out by means of EAP. ABFAB has defined the GSS-API 
Mechanism for the Extensible Authentication Protocol (GSS-EAP) [GSSEAP], which specifies 
how EAP packets can be transported in GSS tokens, and how the key material exported by 
EAP can be used to provide security services (e.g. confidentiality and integrity protection). 
Finally, the AAA protocol is used between the RP and the IdP in order to provide the 
federation substrate, that is, it implements the trust relationships that form the federation. It 
has two purposes: the transport of EAP packets between them, and the delivery from the IdP 
to the RP   ǯ authorization attributes represented as SAML assertions (attribute 
statements). Although any AAA protocol could potentially be used, ABFAB has focused on 
RADIUS, due to its widespread deployment and acceptance.  
ABFAB can provide privacy protection by means of the pseudonymity mechanisms of its 
underlying technologies. In particular, using an EAP tunneling method (e.g. EAP-TTLS 
[EAPTTLS] or PEAP [PEAP]) can hide   ǯ    ǡ  
[SAML2] defines how assertions can make use of pseudonyms for the same purpose. 
Once the end user is authenticated, the IdP generates (or obtains) the first SAML statement 
with information about the end user and sends it to the RP, as described in [SAML-AAA]. 
Moreover, this document also details how the RP and IdP can make use of the SAML Assertion 
Query/Response profile to issue further attribute requests in order to improve the 
authorization decision process. 
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3 Related Work 
Beside the already described traditional OpenStack authentication methods provided by 
Keystone, additional authentication mechanisms can be added as plugins (which is why we 
originally added federated access to OpenStack in this way [FEDOS]). 
The integration of Kerberos into OpenStack to provide advanced authentication 
mechanisms can be found here [OS-KRB]. Kerberos also supports identity federation, by 
means of the so-called Kerberos cross-realm mechanism. Therefore, it would have been 
possible to provide identity federation to OpenStack following the standard Kerberos cross-
realm model. However, the deployment of Kerberos cross-realm infrastructures has been 
scarce, due to some recognized issues [RFC5868]. Thus, the usage of Kerberos has been         ǯ Ǥ  ǡ
some alternatives, such as FedKERB [FEDKRB], PanaKERB [PANAKRB] and EduKERB 
[EDUKRB], have been proposed to obtain the benefits of Kerberos without deploying an 
alternative cross-realm infrastructure, by using a more common and widely used federation 
substrate: the AAA-based federation. However, these solutions add or inflict changes in 
several entities, and require new amendments to standards and related implementations. In ǡ	ǯȋȌǡ
is the central entity in charge of distributing key material, in order to implement a pre-
authentication mechanism for integration with the AAA infrastructure. PanaKERB requires     ȋ ȏȐȌ       ǯ
domain. Finally, EduKERB modifies the KDC to consume a non-standardized token obtained 
during network access authentication. Thus we discounted the use of Kerberos for federated 
access. 
The IETF is also currently working on a SASL and GSS-API mechanism for SAML 2.0 that 
leverages the capabilities of an enhanced client to address federated authentication reusing 
existing SAML bindings and profiles [SASL-SAML-EC]. In this way, SAML can be used for 
arbitrary applications as long as they support either the SASL framework or GSS-API (as 
happens with Keystone, based on the HTTP protocol). The main advantages of this approach 
is that it is under standardization in the IETF WG, and it requires little modifications to 
existing SAML capable RPs and IdPs. Its main disadvantage is that the Client Application must 
first contact the SAML IdP in order to request the SAML authentication statement. This would 
require KeyStone to support SAML, which is not natively integrated. 
4 Identity Federations in OpenStack  
The latest versions of OpenStack (i.e. Juno, Kilo and Liberty) have included generic support for 
federated authentication via an Apache front end.     ǯ 
attributes from the IdP, it passes these to Keystone as environmental variables. In this way, 
Keystone does not need to parse or process the federation protocol messages, since no matter 
what the federation protocol is, the identity attributes are transferred by Apache in the same 
way. This gives OpenStack the ability to permit users not registered with Keystone, but with 
external IdPs, to obtain unscoped/scoped tokens. 
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In order to enable federated authentication, the Keystone administrator must first define 
which external IdPs are trusted to authenticate users. Keystone will then reject any user 
authenticated by an unlisted IdP. Next, since federated users do not exist i ǯ
database, the administrator must define how their federated identity attributes will be 
mapped into existing <Users> or <Groups>. In this way, federated users will inherit the same 
<Roles> on <Projects> as these existing objects. This is achieved by the creation of the 
following additional objects in Keystone: 
 <IdentityProvider>: Represents a trusted IdP that is allowed to authenticate federated 
users in this Keystone. Each <IdentityProvider> has an identifier within Keystone (e.g. 
acmeidp, kent, umeǥȌ. 
 <Mapping>: Represents a list of <Rules> objects.  
 <Rules>: Represents how a specific federated ǯ identity attributes received from the 
IdP via Apache are mapped into a <Group> or <User> known to Keystone. A sample <Rule> 
might ǲorgPersonType attribute with a value of Contractor 
or Guest, then map it to the <Group> named Externalǳ. 
 <Protocol>: Represents a specific authentication protocol (e.g. saml2) supported by an 
<IdentityProvider>. It also indicates a <Mapping> object that should be applied to all the 
users that are authenticated using this <IdentityProvider> and <Protocol> pair. 
Figure 2 depicts the general federated authentication process in Keystone for services such 
as Nova, Neutron, Glance, etc. When a federated user desires to start an authentication 
process, it must access the Keystone URL associated with a particular <IdentityProvider> and 
<Protocol>, and protected by Apache (step 1). Apache must be properly configured to protect 
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Figure 2. OpenStack federated authentication 
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This module will take care of the federated authentication process, interacting with the IdP 
(step 2) to obtain the authentication and identity information about the user. At the end of 
this process, the module establishes a set of environment variables that contain the identity 
information of the authenticated user. Apache forwards the initial user HTTP request to 
Keystone along with these variables (step 3). Keystone uses this information to execute the 
correct <Mapping> rules for the IdP and protocol combination. Once mapped into a <User> or 
<Group> the federated user is sent an unscoped token, he chooses his project, and is given a 
scoped token (step 4) for it. Finally, the user can present the scoped token to the OpenStack 
service, such as Swift, Nova, etc. (step 5). 
It is worth noting that Horizon, the OpenStack web dashboard service, follows a slightly 
different flow. As it is web-based, the end user cannot directly present the scoped token as is 
done for the rest of the services. Instead, Horizon shows a selector for federated 
authentications where the end user can choose the <IdentityProvider> and <Protocol> to be 
used. Horizon then redirects the end user to the appropriate protected URL (following the 
same flow as described above), and the federated authentication is performed. At the end of 
the process, the end user is redirected back to Horizon, including the scoped token in the 
HTTP request using a POST method. Then, Horizon can consume the scoped token in the same 
way as any other service and grant access to the end user. 
5 ABFAB and OpenStack integration 
The objective of the integration is to allow federated users to access OpenStack services 
through any kind of user interface (command line, client desktop application, browser, etc.), 
using the same AAA infrastructure that is already used today for network access, but now for 
federated access to applications. Prior to the development of ABFAB, AAA infrastructures 
have not been used to provide application level access controls. Their re-utilization for this 
purpose will avoid the need to deploy parallel trust infrastructures for the network-layer and 
the application-layer. This is currently a burden for organizations, which need to ensure 
consistency between both infrastructures, and support the extra work of deploying and 



























Figure 3. OpenStack and ABFAB integration 
5.1 Architecture 
The first step for understanding how we have integrated ABFAB into OpenStack is to describe 
how the ABFAB entities have been mapped into OpenStack components. In particular, the 
ABFAB Client can be directly mapped to the OpenStack user, whereas the ABFAB IdP has a 
correspondence with the OpenStack IdP component. Regarding the ABFAB RP, its 
functionality resides in the front end Apache server, since OpenStackǯ federation 
is based on it. However, unlike other Apache authentication modules, where the user is 
redirected to the IdP via HTTP, the ABFAB module uses the HTTP Negotiate [HTTPNG] 
protocol that specifies how to use GSS-API for web authentication. In this case, the RP acts as 
an intermediate entity, taking the EAP packets contained within the GSS-API tokens received 
from the user, and sending them to the IdP using a RADIUS like transport protocol.  This 
process is depicted in Figure 3. 
To perform the ABFAB Client functionality, things are more straightforward, as current 
versions of most web browsers, as well as many command line utilities (such as cURL 
[CURL]), already support the client-side (Initiator) functionality of the HTTP Negotiate 
protocol.  
5.2 Authentication Workflow 
To detail how Keystone can use an ABFAB-based authentication process using the 
proposed architecture, let us assume the user (running a Client) wants to access a particular 
OpenStack service. She first needs to get a scoped token from Keystone, after authenticating 
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Figure 4. OpenStack/ABFAB workflow 
Step 1. The authentication process with Keystone starts when the Client tries to access the 
protected URL on the Apache server. This URL has the following format: 
/v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/{idp}/protocols/{protocol}/auth 
where {idp} is the identifier of the trusted <IdentityProvider> ȋǲabfabǳȌ
the user, and {protocol} is the identifier of the federation <Protocol> that will be used ȋǲabfabǳȌǤ 
Hence, the actual URL would be the following: 
/v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/abfab/protocols/abfab/auth 
Here we encountered the first issue. Neither the Client nor Keystone know which IdP will Ǥǯȋuser@idpname). Thus the 
protected URL must cater for all the IdPs in the AAA network. This necessitated a change in 
Keystone. Instead of assigning one identifier to a trusted IdP, Keystone was modified to accept 
a set of identifiers, where each identifier is the name of one actual IdP, and the 
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<IdentityProvider> in the URL now represents a trusted federation of IdPs. Consequently we Ǯabfabǯoth the protocol and the trusted federation in our protected URL. 
Step 2. The Apache server captures the request to this URL, but it will not allow it to reach 
Keystone until the Client has completed the authentication process. In this case, Apache has 
configured the ABFAB GSS-API module as the authentication module.  
Step 3. The ABFAB module replies to the Client indicating that authentication using HTTP 
Negotiate is required to get access to the requested resource.  
Step 4. Upon receiving this message, the Client calls its GSS-API module to get the first GSS-
Token to be sent to the Apache server. Since the Client is using the GSS-EAP mechanism, this 
GSS-Token will transport an EAP response packet, which contains the userǯ anonymous 
identifier (e.g. anonymous@homeidp).  It is worth noting that the anonymous identifier hides 
the end userǯ ǡǯreal ȋǲhomeidpǳȌ
which will be used to identify the ǯIdP. 
The HTTP Negotiate protocol includes an Authorization HTTP header with the value 
ǲȏ ? ?
-ȐǳǤ 
Step 5. The ABFAB module processes the received GSS-Token using the GSS-EAP 
mechanism, which in turn extracts the EAP packet and sends it to the IdP that is indicated in 
the anonymous identifier (i.e. @homeidp), by using the RADIUS infrastructure.  
Step 6. The IdP receives and processes the EAP packet and creates a new EAP request for 
the Client, which is sent back to the ABFAB module using the RADIUS infrastructure.  
Step 7. The RP extracts the EAP request packet and sends it to the Client using the HTTP 
Negotiate protocol. That is, a base64 encoded GSS-Token is included as the value of a www-
authenticate HTTP header.  
This process (steps 4-7) is repeated until the execution of the EAP method has been 
completed. Typical EAP methods used in ABFAB are EAP-TTLS or EAP-PEAP, both of which 
involve the establishment of a TLS tunnel between the Client and the IdPǡǯ
credentials are not visible to the ABFAB module. The userǯ  identifier (say 
alice@homidp) is sent through an internal EAP method (e.g. EAP-MD5) protected by the TLS 
tunnel. 
Step 8. Once the EAP authentication is complete, the IdP generates an EAP Success packet 
and generates a SAML assertion containing the ǯidentity attributes. This information is 
sent to the ABFAB module using the AAA infrastructure [SAML-AAA]. The NameID field in the 
SAML assertion can contain a pseudonym or transient ID to protect the userǯ identity over 
the RADIUS network. An example of a SAML assertion is shown in Figure 7. 
Attribute Release Policies [ATRP] can be applied in the IdP in order to decide which 
attributes can or can not be revealed to RPs, depending on end user or IdP preferences, the 
application service being requested, etc.  For doing this the end user might, for instance, use a 
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web portal to enumerate the trusted RPs. The lifetime of the assertion is also set up by the IdP 
according to its preferences, although it should not exceed the lifetime of the EAP keying 
material, since the user should be considered unauthenticated beyond that moment. 
Step 9. The ABFAB module extracts the SAML and RADIUS attributes, using the GSS-API 
Naming Extensions [GSSNAM], and provides them to Apache, in the form of HTTP 
environment variables (e.g. IdǡǡǥȌ.  
Step 10. As the user has now been successfully authenticated, Apache lets the initial HTTP 
request from the Client reach Keystone, along with the environment variables obtained from 
the ABFAB module. 
Step 11. Keystone executes the <Mapping> rules that correspond to the <IdentityProvider> 
and <Protocol> indicated in the request URL (in this case, abfab and abfab). The execution of 
these mapping rules associates the federated user with an existing <User> or one or more 
<Groups>. For example, the <Mapping> might establish that if the federated user has the 
eduPersonAffiliation SAML attribute with a value of student, then she will be assigned to the 
<Group> called students. Separately the Keystone administrator will have assigned on or more 
<Roles> in <Projects> to the students <Group>.  An example of a mapping rule is shown in 
Figure 6. 
Step 12. Once Keystone knows which <Roles> and <Projects> are available to the federated 
user, it generates and delivers the unscoped token to the Client, along with the list of projects 
the user is able to access.  
Step 13. This allows the user to select the desired project, and the Client to request a 
scoped token for it.  
Step 14 and 15. Keystone generates and provides the Client with a scoped token.  
Step 16. Finally, the Client uses this to access the desired Cloud service. Steps 12-16 are  ǯ       the Client, Keystone and 
Service. Examples of these messages can be found here [TOKENS] 
5.3 Security considerations 
The solution proposed in this paper is grounded on well-known security protocols and 
technologies that have been proven to be reliable and secure over the years (e.g. EAP, GSS-ǡǡǥȌǤ
-EAP mechanism, which 
is a relatively new standard, although it has been deeply analyzed during its standardization 
process in the IETF. Moreover, this mechanism makes extensive use of GSS and EAP channel 
bindings [CHBIND] as a means of assuring that the different security layers involved in the 
process share sufficient information to assure they are establishing security associations 
between the same set of entities (i.e. Client, RP, and IdP). In this paper we just provide a 
means of using this mechanism for OpenStack federated access control, therefore it does not 




This section describes the most relevant implementation details along with our deployed 
testbed, in which we have validated the prototype. 
6.1 Software components  
For our testbed we have made use of Moonshot, the ABFAB implementation developed under 
the Moonshot project [MSHOT], on its version 0.9.3. It provides mech_eap, an implementation 
of GSS-EAP. It also implements an Apache authentication module that performs the server-
side (Acceptor) functionality of the HTTP Negotiate protocol. This module is based on the 
existing mod_auth_krb module, and is called mod_auth_gssapi [MODGSS]. Finally, Moonshot 
also provides Client side functionality for Windows OS and various flavours of Linux. This 
includes an Identity Selector software (as seen in section 6.5) used by the user to manage her 
identities and select the one that should be used to perform the authentication process.  
The other component that is needed for the ABFAB AAA infrastructure is the IdP. It is 
based on FreeRadius 3 [FREERAD], and it consists of a RADIUS server that is able to 
authenticate end users, and has the required SAML components to issue the SAML assertions.  
Regarding OpenStack, we chose the Liberty release, as using Juno or Kilo would have 
required some fixes to make them work, since they do not implement complete support for 
federation.  
Another issue we encountered, was that the list of trusted <IdentityProvider> in Keystone 
is not publicly available to unauthenticated users. Our initial fix was to remove all access 
controls from the API call to GET them. Several discussions of how to fix this problem in the 
core release were held in the Keystone group, but no agreement on the best solution was 
reached. At the time of writing the OpenStack administrator has to configure this list 
separately in Horizon. Once the list of trusted IdPs is made available, we still needed to modify 
the Horizon login page so that it could include a way for the user to select his chosen 
<IdentityProvider> and <Protocol> to perform the federated authentication (see Figure 4 step 
1). This is now part of the core Horizon release. 
6.2 Testbed infrastructure for functional validation 
With the software components described in section 6.1 we deployed a testbed for a 
functional validation, involving three different locations: University of Murcia, University of ǡ  
2ǯ 1. In this test scenario, a user from the University of Kent 
(alice@cs.kent.ac.uk), working in the QALab, wants to access the OpenStack Swift service 
deployed at QALab (classe1.qalab.geant.net), which is connected to the AAA infrastructure 
through a RP Proxy/IdP located at the University of Murcia. 
 




Figure 5.  Functional testbed infrastructure 
In the context of the GÉANT project, we could have made use of the currently deployed 
RADIUS infrastructure (used for the eduroam service), in order to test the federated 
OpenStack authentication. The reason for not having done so is that eduroam is a federated 
network access service defined by GÉANT and governed by a set of service policies [EDUPOL], 
agreed and signed by all the federation members. These policies implicitly disallow ABFAB 
data traffic, at it is not specific for the network access service. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
our performance tests, this reduced infrastructure behaves in the same way as eduroam, 
except that it is without the network delays.  
Using this testbed we validated our proposal from a functional point of view, 
demonstrating how AAA federated infrastructures can be used for access control in 
OpenStack thanks to the ABFAB technologies. It is worth mentioning that end user experience 
is identical, regardless of a) the location of the user on the AAA infrastructure, and b) the 
complexity of, and number of nodes in, the AAA infrastructure. 
6.3 Testbed infrastructure for performance analysis and public demonstrator 
We also deployed an additional simplified testbed (depicted in Figure 6) with a twofold 
objective: 1) to use it to analyze the performance of the proposal, and 2) to serve as a public 
demonstrator (see section 6.5). This testbed involves a single location: the University of 
Murcia. In this test scenario, a student from the University of Murcia (alice@um.es) wants to 
access an OpenStack Swift service deployed at the University of Murcia (abfab-
openstack.inf.um.es), which is connected to the AAA infrastructure through an IdP located at 














The reasons for building the simplified testbed were mainly based on the difficulties we 
found in granting access to a public demo in the QALab deployment using our actual IdP at 








Figure 6. Testbed infrastructure 
In the following we provide more details about the different components of the testbed. 
6.3.1 RP  
The RP (abfab-openstack.inf.um.es) consists of a dedicated virtual machine (VMWare ESXi 
5.5), provisioned with an 4-core Intel Xeon CPU (2.53 GHz) and 2 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 
14.04 and OpenStack Liberty. It has a Swift service and an Apache server with the 
mod_auth_gssapi authentication module. Keystone has been configured with an 
<IdentityProvider> named abfab and a <Protocol> named abfab. Thus, Apache has been 
configured to use mod_auth_gssapi to protect the following URL: 
/v3/OS-FEDERATION/identity_providers/abfab/protocols/abfab/auth  
Keystone has been configured with a <Mapping> for the protected URL and its 
corresponding <Rules> that say that any user from any organization within the abfab 
federation with an eduPersonAffiliation attribute of Faculty will be assigned to the OpenStack 
<Group> called faculty, and any user from any organization within the abfab federation with 
an eduPersonAffiliation attribute of Student will be assigned to the OpenStack <Group> called 
students. Members of the faculty group have been granted access to the <Project> privatefiles 
whereas members of the student group have been granted access to the <Project> publicfiles. 
This <Mapping> is represented in its JSON format as follows: 
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Figure 7. Mapping rules 
The Moonshot RP (i.e. the Apache module) has been configured to deliver the entire 
RADIUS traffic through to the IDP located at the University of Murcia.  
6.3.2 IdP 
The IDP (moonshot.inf.um.es) consists of a dedicated virtual machine (VMWare ESXi 5.5), 
provisioned with an 4-core Intel Xeon CPU (2.53 GHz) and 2 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 
14.04 and FreeRadius 3.0.7.  It is configured to use EAP TTLS/MD5 as the authentication 
method. It handles the um.es test RADIUS realm. It is configured to generate and distribute a 
SAML assertion with basic information about the user. The delivered SAML assertion is 
depicted in Figure 8. Note the use of a pseudonym for the Subjectǯ Name ID element (first 
highlighted text), in order to protect her privacy. Note also that the value of the 
eduPersonAffiliation attribute for Alice is set to Student (second highlighted text), so she will 
be mapped to the OpenStack <Group> students. 
<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" 
               ID="48217432493" IssueInstant="2015-03-19T08:30:00Z" Version="2.0"> 
  <saml:Conditions NotOnOrAfter="2015-03-19T08:30:00Z" /> 
  <saml:Issuer>um.es</saml:Issuer> 
    <saml:Subject> 
      <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient"> 
        2137423432412387981231@um.es 
      </saml:NameID> 
    </saml:Subject> 
  <saml:AttributeStatement> 
    <saml:Attribute Name="eduPersonAffiliation" 
                    NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri"> 
      <saml:AttributeValue>Student</saml:AttributeValue> 
    </saml:Attribute> 
  </saml:AttributeStatatement> 
</saml:Assertion> 
Figure 8. SAML assertion 
The Moonshot software comes with a very basic SAML template that only allows the 
NameID to be substituted at runtime with the value of the RADIUS User-Name attribute.  This 
is insufficient for most practical purposes. We provided a temporary fix for our testing 
purposes, by hardcoding two different assertions into FreeRAdius. If the user was Alice, then 
the "student" assertion was sent. If the user was Carol, the "faculty" one was sent. 
[ 
   { 
      "remote":[ 
        { "type": "eduPersonAffiliation", "any_one_of": ["Faculty"] } 
      ], 
      "local":[ 
         { "group":{"name":"Faculty"} } 
      ] 
   }, 
   { 
      "remote":[ 
        { "type": "eduPersonAffiliation", "any_one_of": ["Student"] } 
      ], 
      "local":[ 
         { "group":{ "name":"Student" } } 
      ] 
   } 
] 
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6.3.3 End User / Client 
The client is deployed on a dedicated virtual machine (VBox 5.0.14), provisioned with a 4-
core Intel I3 CPU (1.90GHz) and 2 GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04. It has a Firefox browser 
with support for HTTP Negotiate enabled. It also has the Moonshot plugin installed, including 
the Identity Selector software. The user has the two identities alice@um.es and carol@um.es 
configured (see section 6.5). Finally, the client is connected to the network using a wireless 
interface, which makes the RTT (Round-trip time) to the RP significant (see the following 
section). 
6.4 Performance analysis 
Using this testbed, we carried out a performance analysis of the solution for the purpose of 
verifying that the required time to complete a federated authentication, ignoring the network 
delays of the AAA infrastructure, is within acceptable values and, thus, the proposed solution 
does not result in too long waits that might lead end users to give up before completing the 
authentication process. 
For the analysis we performed 200 executions of an ABFAB-based federated keystone 
authentication, measuring the sample mean value and the confidence interval at 95% 
confidence (computed as Sample Mean ± 2 * standard deviation) of the following indicators, 
where X and Y represent the core entities (Client, RP, or IDP): 
 COMP (X). The amount of time spent by entity X to perform the required functionality. 
This indicator specifically excludes network delays. We have calculated the value of this 
indicator as the sum of the time elapsed in component X between the reception of a 
message (either a request or a response) and the emission of the resulting message. 
 WAIT (X). The amount of time spent by entity X waiting for the response of the request 
sent. We have calculated this value as the time elapsed in component X between the 
emission of a request message and the receipt of the corresponding response message. 
 NETW (X, Y). The amount of time spent delivering request and response messages 
between entities X and Y. NETW(X, Y) = WAIT(X) - COMP(Y) - WAIT(Y). This is the general 
equation for when X talks to Y and Y talks to Z. If only X and Y communicate then WAIT(Y) 
is zero. 
 TOTAL_TIME. The amount of time that is required by the Client to complete the access 
process. TOTAL_TIME = COMP(Client) + NETW(Client, RP) + COMP(RP) + NETW(RP, IDP) 
+ COMP(IDP). This can also be measured directly as the time between the first message 
sent and the last message received. 
In order to measure these indicators we made use of Wireshark [WSHARK]. With this 
software, we captured the network traffic on each one of these components, and used it to 
calculate the values of the indicators with the help of a set of scripts. The results we obtained 
from this analysis are provided in Table 1, whereas Figure 9 presents a stacked graph with 
these values. 
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Table 1. Performance results (in milliseconds) 
 ABFAB federated authentication 
Sample mean time ± 2 * (std. dev.) ms 
COMP(EU) 96.21 ± 01.88 
NETW(EU, RP) 543.76 ± 10.30 
COMP(RP) 453.35 ± 10.50 
NETW(RP, IDP) 1.55 ± 00.05 
COMP(IDP) 5.10 ± 00.32 
TOTAL_TIME 1099.97 ± 23.05 
 
  
Figure 9. Performance results graph. 
As can be observed, the average total time required to perform the federated authentication is  ? ? ? ? ? Ǥǡspending  ? ? ? ? Ǥon computations (COMP(EU)+COMP(RP)+COMP(IDP)), and 
having  ? ? ? ?ǤǤWe confirmed that this calculation is correct 
by measuring the time between the first message sent by the client and the last message 
received, and the results were broadly comparable. We should note that in this demo, the IDP 
and the RP are deployed on the same local network and thus, the network time between both 
elements is negligible (as shown in the value of NETW(RP, IDP)). However, in production 
environments, where the RP must contact a remote IDP, we can expect an average network       ? ? ? ? Ǥǡ    ȏ
ȐǤ ǡ n production 





























benefits of integrating OpenStack with ABFAB-based federations in terms of security, 
usability, and user management simplification, we consider this is a reasonable amount of 
time as it will hardly be noticed by end users. This is especially true if we consider that 
Keystone authentication is performed only at the moment of obtaining an unscoped token. 
After that, the token itself is used to obtain further scoped tokens to be used to access to the 
different services. Nonetheless, the techniques described in [GSSERP] also could be applicable. 
In such a case, both the network and computation times would be significantly reduced. 
6.5 Public demo of the federated authentication process 
The rest of this section describes, with snapshots of the process (Figure 10), how a real 




Figure 10. Federated access to Horizon 
 First, user Alice (not a Faculty member) uses her browser to connect to the Horizon login 
page (step 1) and selects the ABFAB authentication mechanism.  At this point, the Moonshot 
Identity manager pops up, prompting Alice to select the identity she wants to use (step 2). 
She selects alice@um.es and starts the authentication process. ǯǡǯmod_auth_gssapi on the RP, 
and the RADIUS IdP. When it finalizes, Keystone receives the SAML assertion attributes, 
executes the <Mapping> to determine the <Groups> that must be assigned to Alice, then 
determines the projects and roles assigned to these groups. As Alice is only a member of one 
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group (students) and this only has access to one project (publicfiles), this is sent to Horizon in 
the redirect. The Liberty release of OpenStack automatically chooses the default project for 
the user and returns this to Keystone. As can be observed in figure 9 (step 3), Alice is then 
granted access to the publicfiles <Project> by Keystone. Having access to the publicfiles 
<Project>, Alice can modify the PublicData container within the Swift component (step 4).  
It should be noted that ABFAB provides zero sign on, because the next time Alice accesses 
OpenStack, her identity and password will be automatically selected and sent to the Murcia 
IdP without her having to enter anything.  
On the other hand, the user Carol (carol@um.es) has an eduPersonAffiliation value of 
Faculty. Hence, if the end user switches the selected identity to Carol, she will be assigned to 
the privatefiles <Project>, and therefore has access to the PrivateData container. 
The demo is publicly available at http://abfab-openstack.inf.um.es/, where there are 
further instructions to set up a suitable client, and to run all the possible tests.  
6.6 Integrating other Cloud solutions with ABFAB 
After having performed the work described in this paper, we have gathered enough 
knowledge to outline how a similar approach could be followed to integrate ABFAB support 
into other Cloud solutions. First, the Cloud solution must provide an identifiable URL that lets 
anyone be considered as authenticated. Second, that particular URL must be protected with 
Apache using the mod_auth_gssapi module. The module must be properly configured 
specifying the location of the ABFAB IdP. Finally, the Cloud solution must use the 
REMOTE_USER Apache environment variable set up by the mod_auth_gssapi module as the 
name of the federated end user. Optionally, the Cloud solution may also use the additional 
Apache environment variables conveying the information from the SAML Assertion, to 
perform an authorization process before granting access to the requested resources. 
7 Conclusions and future work  
Cloud technologies provide a convenient way to distribute the computing load in medium 
and large deployments, making them easily scalable and providing better resource utilization. 
Introducing federation support into them offers a new opportunity for extending their 
collaboration possibilities. However, most federation technologies focus on web-based 
services, while CLI-based ones (such as the Cloud) have been largely forgotten. To solve this 
gap, the IETF ABFAB WG has defined a set of technologies to integrate any kind of service with 
AAA-based federations, which are nowadays successfully deployed for providing access 
control to the network service (e.g. eduroam).  
In this paper we have shown that a cloud service, such as OpenStack can be smoothly 
integrated in a federation built with an AAA infrastructure, by using ABFAB technologies. This 
is achieved by integrating the functionality of the ABFAB RP into Keysǯ-end,    ǯ  Ǥ     
authentication and authorization workflow has been provided demonstrating how 
information is exchanged between the Client, OpenStack and the AAA-based IdP.   
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Beyond the theoretical description of the process, we have deployed a real scenario where 
this integration has been successfully tested, making use of Moonshot, the ABFAB reference 
implementation. The details of this deployment, along with snapshots of an authentication 
process using the Horizon cloud service, can be used by other organizations as a guide to 
creating similar testbeds and evaluating this integration. Moreover, this experience has leaded 
us to conclude that a similar process could be used for other Cloud solutions that were 
interested on adding support for ABFAB-based authentication. Finally, the results of the 
performance analysis show the feasibility of this solution in terms of average authentication 
time, which in production environments would be below 2 seconds.  
As future work, we envisage that increasing the range of supported client devices will be 
needed for wider acceptability. Currently, Moonshot is supported in GNU/Linux and Microsoft 
Windows environments, but is still unavailable for Apple MAC OSX and mobile devices (e.g. 
Android, Mac iOS, etc.).  
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